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Many tests of speciﬁc ‘executive functions’ show deﬁcits after frontal lobe lesions. These deﬁcits appear on a background of
reduced ﬂuid intelligence, best measured with tests of novel problem solving. For a range of speciﬁc executive tests, we ask
how far frontal deﬁcits can be explained by a general ﬂuid intelligence loss. For some widely used tests, e.g. Wisconsin Card
Sorting, we ﬁnd that ﬂuid intelligence entirely explains frontal deﬁcits. When patients and controls are matched on ﬂuid
intelligence, no further frontal deﬁcit remains. For these tasks too, deﬁcits are unrelated to lesion location within the frontal
lobe. A second group of tasks, including tests of both cognitive (e.g. Hotel, Proverbs) and social (Faux Pas) function, shows
a different pattern. Deﬁcits are not fully explained by ﬂuid intelligence and the data suggest association with lesions in the
right anterior frontal cortex. Understanding of frontal lobe deﬁcits may be clariﬁed by separating reduced ﬂuid intelligence,
important in most or all tasks, from other more speciﬁc impairments and their associated regions of damage.
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Introduction
The fact that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in higher
cognitive skills and in the achievement of effective behaviour is
well supported by evidence from lesion and neuroimaging studies.
Although many theories have been proposed, the mechanisms by
which the prefrontal cortex attains its goals remain unknown.
Commonly, the prefrontal cortex is supposed to support ‘executive
functions’, broadly conceived as processes that organize and
control cognitive function. Proposed executive processes include
functions such as planning, monitoring, energizing, switching
and inhibition (Stuss, 2007). Over the past 100 years many clinical
and experimental tests have been used to measure these proposed
executive functions. Commonly, different functions have been
presumed to be associated with different subregions within the
prefrontal cortex (Stuss et al., 2002). However, evidence regarding
the separability of executive functions is often inconsistent,
and strong double dissociations are the exception rather than
the rule.
As an example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant and
Berg, 1948) is one of the most widely used executive tests,
thought to assess problem solving, strategic planning, use of
environmental feedback to shift set, and inhibition of impulsive
responding. Even though poor performance on this test has
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Rezai et al., 1993), evidence of a clear speciﬁcity to this region is
scant and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test deﬁcits have been found
after superior medial and orbitofrontal lesions (Stuss et al., 1983,
2000), as well as after non-frontal damage (Anderson et al., 1991;
Horner et al., 1996). Moreover, functional neuroimaging studies
have shown widespread activation of frontal and non-frontal brain
regions during the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Barcelo ´ and
Santome-Calleja, 2000). Within the frontal lobes, lateral, anterior
cingulate and ventral activations have been described (Buchsbaum
et al., 2005).
A second example is a range of tasks used to measure
emotional or evaluative aspects of decision-making, often linked
to ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The Iowa Gambling Task, for
example, requires decision-making based on a history of positive
and negative rewards, and has shown some evidence for selective
deﬁcit following ventromedial lesions (Bechara et al., 2000).
Impairments can also follow dorsolateral lesions, however,
suggesting that both ventral and dorsal aspects of the prefrontal
cortex must interact in performance of this task (Manes et al.,
2002). Similar questions concern the ability to make inferences
about others’ thoughts and feelings, commonly referred to as
theory of mind. Based on neuroimaging and lesion ﬁndings,
several authors have proposed a critical role of the anteromedial
frontal lobe in this ‘mentalizing’ capacity (Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Frith and Frith 2006), but again, some studies show
contradictory results (Bird et al., 2004).
In parallel to these proposals of speciﬁc executive functions,
perhaps associated with speciﬁc regions of frontal cortex, is the
importance of the frontal lobe in ‘general intelligence’ or
Spearman’s g (Spearman, 1904, 1927). The concept of g was
introduced to explain universal positive correlations between
different cognitive tests; to some extent, Spearman proposed,
some common g factor contributes to success in all cognitive
activities. The best tests of g—i.e. the tests most predictive of
a general ability to do well—are so-called ﬂuid intelligence tests,
calling for novel problem solving with simple visual or other mate-
rials (Cattell, 1971; Carroll, 1993). Widely used examples are
Raven’s Matrices (Raven, 1938; Raven et al., 1988) and Cattell’s
Culture Fair (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973).
Fluid intelligence reﬂects current ability for abstract thought and
reasoning, and is impaired after frontal lesions (Duncan et al.,
1995). It contrasts with tests of prior knowledge and educational
achievement (e.g. vocabulary)—so-called tests of ‘crystallized
intelligence’ (Cattell, 1971) which are less dependent on frontal
lobe function.
The importance of the frontal lobe in g—in particular in ﬂuid
intelligence—raises the question of relations between g and exec-
utive deﬁcit. As ﬂuid intelligence is positively correlated with all
tasks—including any putative test of executive function—we may
ask how well executive deﬁcits are explained by a ﬂuid intelligence
loss. Though many previous studies describe deﬁcits in speciﬁc
executive tests following frontal damage, there has been no
systematic study of relations to ﬂuid intelligence for different
tests and lesion locations.
Two models may be considered. The ﬁrst, following Spearman
(1904), proposes that g is a measure of some speciﬁc processing
activity, important in controlling many different forms of behav-
iour. In functional imaging studies, ﬂuid intelligence tests produce
extensive activity on the lateral frontal surface, in particular around
the inferior frontal sulcus and anterior insula/frontal operculum; in
the dorsal anterior cingulate/pre-supplementary motor area; and
along the intraparietal sulcus (Prabhakaran et al., 1997; Esposito
et al., 1999; Duncan et al., 2000; Bishop et al., 2008). Consistent
with a role in g, the same pattern of activity is associated with
increased demand in many different cognitive domains, including
perception, episodic and working memory, response selection and
inhibition, etc. (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Duncan, 2006). In cor-
responding regions of the monkey brain, especially lateral prefron-
tal cortex, electrophysiology shows a picture of highly plastic
neural function, the same cells adapting to code different kinds
of task-relevant information in different behavioural contexts
(Duncan, 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). In any task, the result
is a dense, broadly distributed representation of relevant stimuli,
responses, rules, rewards, etc. Elsewhere we have proposed that
this ﬂexible internal model of task-relevant content is important in
controlling diverse forms of behaviour (Duncan, 2001). It may be
especially taxed when relevant information is complex and novel,
as in typical problem solving tasks, and might thus provide much
of the processing basis for g (Duncan, 2005; Duncan et al., 2008).
A closely related idea is the ‘global workspace’ (Dehaene et al.,
1998, 2003), a limited-capacity representation of task-relevant
content for diverse kinds of behaviour.
Predictions for this model are illustrated in Fig. 1A and B.
The ﬁgure shows possible relationships between ﬂuid intelligence
scores and deﬁcits in speciﬁc executive tests (X and Y). In the ﬁrst
case (Fig. 1A), X deﬁcits in the patient group are entirely mediated
through a change in g. In controls, there is the expected positive
correlation between X and ﬂuid intelligence, reﬂecting the contri-
bution of g to success in X. In patients, the loss in g is reﬂected by
reduced ﬂuid intelligence scores, and this loss in ﬂuid intelligence
entirely explains the corresponding loss in X; for controls and
patients with the same ﬂuid intelligence, expected scores on
X are equal (equivalent to no group difference between patients
and controls once ﬂuid intelligence is covaried). In Fig. 1B, in con-
trast, deﬁcits in X reﬂect a speciﬁc frontal component of the task
that is unrelated to g. Though g contributes to X—shown by
the positive correlation—it does not explain the deﬁcit in the
patient group. X is impaired even when patients and controls
are matched in g.
A different model is illustrated in Fig. 1C and D. The classical
alternative to Spearman’s concept of g is the proposal that tests of
general intelligence reﬂect the average or combined activity of
many separate cognitive processes (Thomson, 1951). One plausi-
ble possibility is that complex tasks such as Raven’s Matrices
involve a variety of different executive functions, perhaps
mediated by separate regions of frontal cortex. If this is so, then
in different frontal groups we should ﬁnd a pattern of dissociations
between different executive tests. Figure 1C and D illustrate the
simplest possible case, in which performance on a ﬂuid intelligence
test is some increasing function, f(X, Y), of just two executive
functions, each well measured by its own separate test. In each
panel, results are compared for regions of frontal damage selec-
tively impairing X and Y.I fX is impaired (Fig. 1, patient group 1),
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scores on X, and relatively good scores on Y. In this group, match-
ing with controls for ﬂuid intelligence must result in poorer patient
performance for test X, but better performance for test Y; the
latter reﬂecting the high premorbid value of Y that would be
required to achieve the obtained f(X, Y) after damage to X.
When Y is impaired (Fig. 1, patient group 2), the opposite rela-
tions hold. The arguments are easily extended to a model with any
larger number of separable executive functions. For such models,
the expectation is a pattern of freely dissociating executive deﬁcits,
providing that deﬁcits (i) are associated with separate regions
of damage; and (ii) can be separately measured with different
cognitive tests.
In the present study we examined the role of ﬂuid intelligence in
a broad variety of executive deﬁcits. In Experiment 1 we used two
classical tasks, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Verbal Fluency
(Benton and Hamsher, 1976). In Experiment 2 we employed a
more comprehensive set of executive and social functioning
tasks. First, we used the Ineco Frontal Screening battery
(Torralva et al., 2009b), a brief clinical tool that includes assess-
ment of motor sequencing and inhibition, working memory and
several other tasks based on the clinical literature. Second, we
used two further cognitive tests, the Iowa Gambling Task,
putatively associated with ventromedial frontal lesions (Bechara
et al., 2000), and the Hotel Task (Manly et al., 2002, Torralva
et al., 2009a), developed from an earlier test that detected
difﬁculties in strategy production among frontal patients with
otherwise good executive test scores (Shallice and Burgess,
1991). Third, we included two tests more related to social
function, Faux Pas (Stone et al., 1998) and Mind in the Eyes
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). In both experiments, ﬂuid intelligence
was measured with the Culture Fair (Institute for Personality and
Ability Testing, 1973). In addition to comparing frontal patients as
a group with controls, we searched for associations between
speciﬁc task deﬁcits and lesion locations. One simple and inﬂuen-
tial subdivision distinguishes between right-lateral, left-lateral, infe-
rior medial and superior medial areas (Stuss et al., 2000, 2002,
2005; Stuss, 2006; Shallice et al., 2007). In a ﬁrst set of analyses,
we compared these lesion subgroups for each executive test. In a
second approach, we examined lesion overlaps for executive def-
icits over and above those predicted by ﬂuid intelligence.
Methods
Experiment 1
Subjects
Patients with chronic focal frontal lesions were recruited from the
Cambridge Cognitive Neuroscience Research Panel at the MRC
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (n=36) in Cambridge, UK and
from the Institute of Cognitive Neurology Research Data Base in
Figure 1 Potential relationships between ﬂuid intelligence and deﬁcits in speciﬁc executive tests X and Y. Higher values on each scale
indicate better performance. (A) Deﬁcit fully explained by g.( B) Deﬁcit in speciﬁc function unrelated to g.( C and D) Predictions for
model with ﬂuid intelligence a joint function of separate executive processes X and Y.
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resection or cerebrovascular (Table 1) and all patients gave informed
consent prior to inclusion. The mean age of patients was 51.1 years
(SD=12.4, range=27–69). Premorbid intelligence was estimated using
the revised National Adult Reading Test (Nelson and Willison, 1991)
for British subjects and the WAT-BA (Del Ser et al., 1997; Burin et al.,
2000) for Argentineans. Mean estimated premorbid Intelligence
Quotient (IQ) was 110.3 (SD=12.6).
Healthy control subjects were recruited from the volunteer panel of
the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (n=33) and were
matched with patients for age and National Adult Reading Test-
estimated IQ. The mean age of controls was 48.4 years (SD=12.9,
Table 1 Patient characteristics
Patient Age Sex Aetiology Side Estimated premorbid IQ Years post onset Included in expt 2
Inferior medial
1 MB 45 F Tumour Left 108 9 –
2 MB 45 M Haemorrhage Left 108 4 –
3 CM 54 F Tumour Left 118 2 –
4 MS 61 F Tumour Right 111 2 Y
5 DP 41 M Tumour Bilateral 115 1 Y
6 SV 41 F Tumour Bilateral 128 2 Y
7 MEA 59 F Tumour Bilateral 108 3 months –
Superior medial
1 JT 56 M Tumour Left 82 4 –
2 GD 44 F Tumour Left 102 12 –
3 DT 69 M Infarct Left 111 4 –
4 PP 58 F Tumour Left 103 2 Y
5 CE 64 M Aneurysm Right 120 2 –
6 A (T) C 66 M Infarct Left 97 3 –
7 JM 65 M Tumour Right 122 1 –
8 LB 29 F Tumour Right 88 8 months Y
Left lateral
1 SD 37 F Aneurysm and Haematoma Left 110 3 –
2 AD 61 F Infarct Left 120 3 Y
3 PM 47 M Tumour Left 121 3 Y
4 TG 33 M Abscess Left 121 1 –
5 YS 64 F Infarct Left 98 2 Y
6 WB 29 M Tumour Left 98 2 Y
7 RS 59 F Infarcts Bilateral 128 6 months Y
Right lateral
1 PP 51 M Tumour Right 115 2 –
2 KH 41 M Tumour Right 124 4 –
3 SS 46 F Tumour Right 97 3 Y
4 MS 68 M Infarct Right 121 1 Y
5 CG 50 F Tumour Right 111 30 –
6 GB 42 M Tumour Right 100 8 Y
7 ET 47 F Infarct Right 126 2 Y
8 AS 62 M Tumour Right 94 1 –
9 RB 53 M Tumour Right 106 2 Y
10 PB 53 F Tumour Right 87 8 months –
11 RH 68 F Tumour Right 118 20 Y
12 PG 28 F Tumour Right 110 3 –
13 MD 68 M Infarct Right 127 2 Y
14 JB 60 M Tumour Right 127 8 months Y
Multiple
1 DR 55 M Tumour Right 101 2 –
2 FG 39 F Tumour Right 106 2 Y
3 DC 27 M Abscess Bilateral 100 2 –
4 MD 65 F Tumour Bilateral 111 14 –
5 BR 67 F Tumour Left 116 4 –
6 IB 38 F Tumour Bilateral 120 1 Y
7 NM 46 M Tumour Right 88 2 Y
8 MR 46 M Tumour Bilateral 132 2 –
Where ages and times post onset differed for Experiments 1 and 2, values given are for Experiment 1.
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was 109.6 (SD=12.3).
Neuroradiological assessment
MRI scans were performed for all patients and interpreted by a
neurologist with experience in structural neuroimaging, who was
blind to the experimental results (FM). Lesions were traced using
MRIcro (Rorden and Brett, 2000; http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/
rorden/mricro.html) and normalized to a standard template using sta-
tistical parametric mapping-5 software (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, England; www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk) with
cost-function masking to mask the lesion from the calculation of the
normalization parameters (Brett et al., 2001). Using the Brodmann
area maps provided with MRIcroN (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/
rorden/mricron), templates were created for four frontal regions:
inferior medial (Brodmann area 24, 25, 32, plus medial parts of
Brodmann area 10, 11, all extending up to level of genu of corpus
callosum); superior medial (Brodmann area 24, 25, 32 and medial 10,
11, all above level of genu, plus medial parts of Brodmann area 6, 8,
9); left lateral (Brodmann area 43–47, plus lateral parts of Brodmann
area 6, 8, 9, 10, 11); and right lateral (Brodmann area as for left
lateral). To separate lateral from medial we used a ﬁxed X coordinate
of 15 in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space. For
each patient, we calculated the percentage of each region included
in the lesion. For subgroup analysis, patients were assigned to one of
the four subgroups based on which region had the greatest percent-
age damage. Using this criterion, seven patients were classiﬁed as
inferior medial, eight as superior medial, seven as left lateral and 14
as right lateral (Table 1). Patients with lesions involving more than
20% of each of two or more regions were excluded from subgroup
comparisons (n=8; Table 1, ‘multiple’). Lesion overlaps for left lat-
eral, right lateral, inferior medial and superior medial subgroups are
shown in Fig. 2.
Neuropsychological assessment
Culture Fair (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,
1973)
To assess ﬂuid intelligence we used the Culture Fair, Scale 2 Form A, a
standard test of novel problem solving with a loading of 0.81 on a
general intelligence factor (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,
1973). The test has four timed sets of problems (series completions,
odd-one-out, matrices, topological relations), all involving geometri-
cal ﬁgures. Scores were converted to IQs using the
standardized table of norms (Institute for Personality and Ability
Testing, 1973).
Figure 2 Lesion overlaps for patients with predominantly inferior medial, superior medial, left lateral and right lateral lesions. Colour
scales show numbers of affected patients for each brain voxel.
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For the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test we used Nelson’s modiﬁed
version of the standard procedure. Cards varying on three basic
features—colour, shape and number of items—must be sorted
according to each feature in turn. The participant’s ﬁrst sorting
choice becomes the correct feature, and once a criterion of six
consecutive correct sorts is achieved, the subject is told that the
rules have changed, and cards must be sorted according to a
new feature. After all three features have been used as sorting
criteria, subjects must cycle through them again in the same
order as they did before. Each time the feature is changed, the
next must be discovered by trial and error. Data were available
for 41/44 patients. Score was total number of errors, either before
successful completion of all six task stages, or after a maximum of
48 cards.
Verbal Fluency (Benton and Hamsher, 1976)
In verbal ﬂuency tasks, the subject generates as many items as possible
from a given category. We used the standard phonemic version, asking
subjects to generate words beginning with the letters F, A and S in
successive blocks of 1min/letter. Data were available for 43/44
patients. Score was the total number of correct words generated.
Experiment 2
Subjects
A subgroup of 21 patients was recruited for Experiment 2 (15 patients
from the Cambridge Cognitive Neuroscience Research Panel and 6
from the Institute of Cognitive Neurology Research Data Base; see
Table 1). Lesion aetiology was again mostly cerebrovascular disease
or tumour resection, and all patients gave informed consent to partic-
ipate in this second part of the study. The mean age of patients was
55.7 years (SD=14.2, range=29–77) and mean estimated premorbid
IQ was 111.8 (SD=13.4). Experiment 2 included three inferior medial
patients, two superior medial, ﬁve left lateral, eight right lateral and
three multiple (Table 1).
A new set of healthy control subjects was recruited from the vol-
unteer panel of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (n=7),
and through advertisement in Buenos Aires (n=18). The mean age of
controls was 55.0 years (SD=14.4, range=29–79) and mean National
Adult Reading Test- or WAT-estimated IQ was 114.0 (SD=12.0).
Neuropsychological assessment
Argentinean patients (n=6) were tested at the same time for
Experiments 1 and 2, while the time between experiments ranged
from 2 to 10 years in British patients (n=15). For British patients
the Culture Fair was re-administered at the second test. Additional
tests comprised:
The Ineco Frontal Screening (Torralva et al., 2009b)
The Ineco Frontal Screening is a brief, sensitive, and speciﬁc tool for
the detection of early executive dysfunction. It includes eight subtests:
(I) Motor Programming (Luria, 1966; Dubois et al., 2000). In this
subtest we asked subjects to perform the Luria series ‘ﬁst, edge,
palm’ by initially copying the administrator three times, and
then by repeating the series six times alone. If subjects achieved
six consecutive series by themselves, the score was 3, if they
achieved at least three consecutive series on their own, the
score was 2; if they failed at achieving at least three
consecutive series alone, but achieved three when copying
the examiner, the score was 1; otherwise the score was 0;
(II) Interference (Dubois et al., 2000). Subjects were asked to hit
the table once when the administrator hit it twice, or to hit
the table twice when the administrator hit it only once.
To ensure the subject had clearly understood the task, a
practice trial was performed in which the administrator ﬁrst
hit the table once, three times in succession, and then twice,
three more times. After the practice trial, the examiner com-
pleted the following series: 1–1–2–1–2–2–2–1–1–2. If subjects
made no errors, the score was 3; if they made one or two
errors, the score was 2; for more than two errors, the score
was 1, unless the subject copied the examiner at least four
consecutive times, in which case the score was 0;
(III) Go–No go (Dubois et al., 2000). This task was administered
immediately after Test II. Subjects were told that now, when
the test administrator hit the table once, they should also hit it
once, but when the examiner hit twice, they should do nothing.
To ensure the subject had clearly understood the task, a practice
trial was performed in which the administrator hit
the table once, three times in succession, and then twice,
three more times. After the practice trial the examiner com-
pleted the following series: 1–1–2–1–2–2–2–1–1–2. If subjects
made no errors, the score was 3; for one or two errors the
score was 2; for more than two errors the score was 1,
unless the subject copied the examiner at least four consecutive
times, in which case the score was 0;
(IV) Backwards Digit Span (Hodges, 1994). For this task, subjects
were asked to repeat a progressively lengthening string of digits
in the reverse order. Two trials were given at each successive
list length, beginning at 2 and continuing to a maximum of 7. If
subjects passed either trial at a given list length, then the next
length was administered. The score was the number of lengths
at which the subject passed either trial, maximum 6;
(V) Months (Hodges, 1994). The patient was asked to list the
months of the year backwards, starting with December.
If subjects made no errors, the score was 2; for one error,
the score was 1; otherwise the score was 0. Data were
available for 15/21 patients;
(VI) Spatial Working Memory (Wechsler, 1987). In this task, the
examiner presented the subject with four cubes and pointed
at them in a given sequence. The subject was asked to
repeat the sequence in reverse order. There were four trials,
with sequences of two, three, four and ﬁve cubes, respectively.
Score was number of correctly completed sequences. Data
were available for 15/21 patients;
(VII) Proverbs (Hodges, 1994). In this task three proverbs were read
to the subjects and they were asked to explain their meaning.
For each proverb a score of 1 was given when the subject gave
an adequate explanation, and a score of 0.5 for a correct
example. Otherwise the score was 0. Data were available for
15/21 patients;
(VIII) Hayling (Burgess and Shallice, 1997). This task consisted of a
short version of the original test. Materials were six sentences,
each missing the last word and constructed to strongly con-
strain what it should be. In the ﬁrst part (three sentences),
subjects were read each sentence and asked to complete it
correctly, as quickly as possible. In the second part (remaining
three sentences), subjects were asked for a completion unre-
lated to the sentence in meaning. Only the second part was
scored. For each sentence, a score of 2 was given for a word
unrelated to the sentence, a score of 1 for a word semantically
related to the expected completion, and a score of 0 for the
expected word itself. Data were available for 15/21 patients.
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The task comprised ﬁve primary activities related to running a hotel
(compiling bills, sorting coins for a charity collection, looking up
telephone numbers, sorting conference labels, proofreading). The
materials needed to perform these activities were arranged on a
desk, along with a clock that could be consulted by removing and
then replacing a cover. Subjects were told to try at least some of all
ﬁve activities during a 15min period, so that, at the end of this period,
they would be able to give an estimate of how long each task would
take to complete. It was explained that time was not available to
actually complete the tasks; the goal instead was to ensure that
every task was sampled. Subjects were also asked to remember to
open and close the hotel garage doors at speciﬁed times (open at
6min, close at 12min), using an electronic button. Of the several
scores possible for this task, we used time allocation: for each primary
task we assumed an optimal allocation of 3min, and measured the
summed total deviation (in seconds) from this optimum. Total
deviation was given a negative sign so that high scores meant better
performance. Data were available for 20/21 patients.
Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 2000)
In the Iowa Gambling Task, subjects are required to pick cards from
four decks and receive rewards and punishments (winning and losing
abstract money) depending on the deck chosen. Two ‘risky’ decks
yield greater immediate wins but very signiﬁcant occasional losses.
The other two ‘conservative’ decks yield smaller wins but negligible
losses that result in net proﬁt over time. Subjects make a series of
selections from these four available options, from a starting point of
complete uncertainty. Reward and punishment information acquired
on a trial by trial basis must be used to guide behaviour towards a
ﬁnancially successful strategy. Normal subjects increasingly choose
conservative decks over the 100 trials of the task. Our score was
the total number of conservative minus risky choices. Data were
available for 18/21 patients.
Faux Pas (Stone et al., 1998)
In each trial of this test, the subject was read a short, one paragraph
story. To reduce working memory load, a written version of the story
was also placed in front of the subject. In 10 stories there was a faux
pas, involving one person unintentionally saying something hurtful or
insulting to another. In the remaining 10 stories there were no faux
pas. After each story, the subject was asked whether something inap-
propriate was said and if so, why it was inappropriate. If the answer
was incorrect, an additional memory question was asked to check that
basic facts of the story were retained; if they were not, the story was
re-examined and all questions repeated. The score was 1 point for
each faux pas correctly identiﬁed, or non-faux pas correctly rejected.
Data were available for 20/21 patients.
Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997)
This task consisted of 17 photographs of the eye region of different
human faces. Participants were required to make a two alternative
forced choice that best described what the individual was thinking
or feeling (e.g. worried-calm). The score was total number correct.
Data were available for 20/21 patients.
Results
Experiment 1
Results are shown in Table 2. For all three tasks, one-tailed t-tests
were used to compare patients and controls. As expected, the fron-
tal group was signiﬁcantly impaired on all three tasks: Culture Fair,
Table 2 Patient and control scores, Culture Fair correlations and signiﬁcance of group differences for each task
Patients Controls
Patients
versus
controls
Correlations with
Culture Fair IQ
Patients versus
controls after
adjustment for
Culture Fair IQ
Differences
between the
four frontal
subgroups
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Pr P P P
Experiment 1
Culture Fair IQ 91.32 (15.03) 104.30 (17.63) _0.01 – – – 0.17
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(total errors)
12.85 (9.88) 7.97 (8.27) 0.02 0.61 _0.01 0.36 0.92
Verbal Fluency
a 34.09 (11.16) 42.09 (11.20) _0.01 0.56 _0.01 0.07 0.53
Experiment 2
Motor Programming (max=3) 2.81 (0.51) 2.92 (0.28) 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.82
Interference (max=3) 2.90 (0.30) 3.00 (0.00) 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.78
Go–No go (max=3) 2.52 (0.60) 2.88 (0.33) _0.01 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.27
Digit Span (max=6) 4.71 (1.10) 4.76 (1.05) 0.45 0.41 _0.01 0.31 0.44
Months (max=2) 1.93 (0.26) 1.92 (0.28) 0.56 0.31 0.02 0.66 0.89
Spatial Working Memory (max=4) 2.80 (0.68) 3.20 (0.76) 50.06 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.38
Proverbs (max=3) 1.80 (1.08) 2.74 (0.44) _0.01 0.32 0.02 _0.01 0.86
Hayling (max=6) 3.93 (1.58) 4.96 (0.89) _0.01 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.19
Hotel Task
b 584.90 (292.47) 319.32 (169.52) _0.01 0.25 _0.05 _0.01 0.87
Iowa Gambling Task
c 1.22 (34.54) 13.80 (22.89) _0.05 0.51 _0.01 0.29 0.32
Faux Pas (max=20) 17.50 (2.28) 19.12 (1.36) _0.01 0.31 0.02 _0.01 0.73
Mind in the Eyes (max=17) 13.90 (1.55) 14.20 (1.22) 0.24 0.32 0.02 0.40 0.44
Signiﬁcant P- values shown in bold.
a Total number of words generated.
b Deviation from optimum time per task.
c Conservative minus risky choices.
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P50.02; and Verbal Fluency, t(74)=3.09, P50.005.
Also as expected, both Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Verbal
Fluency were correlated with Culture Fair. Combining data from
patients and controls, Pearson’s correlations and (one-tailed)
signiﬁcance levels were r=0.61, P50.001 for Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test, and r=0.56, P50.001 for Verbal Fluency
(Table 2). Scatterplots are shown in Fig. 3, showing that higher
Culture Fair IQ was strongly associated with better performance in
both executive tasks.
The scatterplots suggest that, for these two executive tasks,
frontal deﬁcits were entirely explained by ﬂuid intelligence
(cf. Fig. 1A). The effect of the frontal lesion was simply to shift
the Culture Fair distribution downward, without changing its
relation to executive task performance. To assess this conclusion,
t-tests comparing patients and controls were repeated following
adjustment for Culture Fair IQ as a covariate (equivalent to ana-
lysis of covariance with two-level factor patients versus controls).
For both tasks, the difference between patients and controls was
no longer signiﬁcant; for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test,
t(71)=0.35, P=0.36, and for Verbal Fluency, t(73)=1.48,
P=0.07, both tests again one-tailed (Table 2).
Figure 3 also suggests little difference between left lateral, right
lateral, inferior medial and superior medial subgroups. In conﬁr-
mation, ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant difference between these
groups, for Culture Fair IQ, F(3, 32)=1.76, P=0.17, for Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test, F(3, 30)=0.16, P=0.92, or for Verbal Fluency,
F(3, 31)=0.76, P=0.53 (Table 2, rightmost column; ANOVAs on
raw scores unadjusted for Culture Fair).
As frontal lesions are sometimes speciﬁcally linked with
perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Milner,
1963), analyses were repeated using percentage perseverative
errors (Nelson, 1976) instead of the total error score. For this
measure, the group difference between patients and controls
was not signiﬁcant, t(72)=0.17, P=0.43, accompanied by a
weaker correlation with Culture Fair, r=0.31, P50.005. Again,
ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant difference between frontal
subgroups, F(3, 30)=0.28, P=0.84.
In a further subsidiary analysis, numbers of problems correctly
solved were examined for each of the four separate subtests of the
Culture Fair. The correlation with Wisconsin Card Sorting Test total
errors was negative for all four subtests (median 0.52), and with
Verbal Fluency score positive for all four subtests (median 0.43), sug-
gesting behaviour similar to that of total IQ scores from the full test.
Experiment 2
Again, one-tailed t-tests were used to compare patients (n=21)
and controls (n=25). Results are shown in Table 2. The frontal
group was signiﬁcantly impaired on three subtests of the Ineco
Frontal Screening: Go–No go, t(44)=2.54, P50.01; Proverbs,
t(38)=3.88, P50.001; Hayling, t(38)=2.64, P50.01. One other
(Spatial Working Memory) was marginal, t(38)=1.67, P50.06.
Signiﬁcant differences were also found for deviation from optimal
time allocation on the Hotel Task t(43)=3.82, P50.001, in the
Faux Pas t(43)=2.95, P50.005 and in the Iowa Gambling Task
t(41)=1.69, P50.05.
For all tasks, correlations with Culture Fair were positive,
showing better performance associated with higher IQ (Table 2).
The correlation was signiﬁcant for 9/12 tasks, including the six
with signiﬁcant difference between patients and controls.
For these six tasks, scatterplots relating performance to Culture
Fair score are shown in Fig. 4. Contrary to the results from
Experiment 1, these scatterplots suggest some difference between
patients and controls even when correcting for the difference in
IQ (cf. Fig. 1B). As before, additional t-tests compared patients
and controls after adjusting for IQ scores. For the Iowa Gambling
Task, adjustment removed the signiﬁcant patient–control differ-
ence, t(40)=1.07, P=0.29. For the remaining ﬁve tasks, however,
signiﬁcant differences remained even after such adjustment
(Table 2).
Again, scatterplots in Fig. 4 suggest no evident differences
between left lateral, right lateral, inferior medial and superior
medial subgroups. Though the result is tempered by small subject
numbers, in particular for inferior medial and superior medial,
ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant difference between subgroups in
any of the 12 tasks of Experiment 2 (Table 2). Given previous
suggestions that inferior medial damage may be especially impor-
tant in social or emotional functions, supplementary tests com-
pared all patients with any inferior medial damage (n=8) to
remaining patients (n=12), separately for the Iowa Gambling
Task, Mind in the Eyes and Faux Pas. In no case was the differ-
ence close to signiﬁcant; for the Iowa Gambling Task
t(16)=0.81, P=0.79 (data unavailable for two patients without
Figure 3 Experiment 1. Regressions of Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and verbal ﬂuency on Culture Fair IQ. Points show data for single
patients (coloured) and controls (empty); regression line is calculated on combined patient and control data.
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and Faux Pas t(18)=1.00, P=0.33.
In a further analysis we employed a lesion overlap method for
more targeted examination of deﬁcits beyond those explained by
ﬂuid intelligence. First, we examined the relationship between
such deﬁcits in the ﬁve tasks where they were found (Go–No
go, Proverbs, Hayling, Hotel, Faux Pas). For each task, scores
for each patient and control were converted to residuals after
adjusting for ﬂuid intelligence (Figs 3 and 4, vertical distances
from the regression line). Residuals in the ﬁve tasks were then
correlated, for a total of 10 correlations between all possible
task pairs (see Supplementary Table). Combining the data for
patients and controls, all 10 correlations were positive
(median=0.30, range=0.03 to 0.52). For patients alone, 7/10
correlations were positive (median=0.14, range=0.36 to
0.45), while for controls alone 9/10 were positive
(median=0.28, range=0.03 to 0.47). Together, these results
suggest that, across the ﬁve tasks, deviations from the score
predicted by ﬂuid intelligence may be traced at least in part to
some common factor. For each patient, accordingly, we obtained
a mean residual across the ﬁve tasks (or fewer for patients with
missing data), and examined lesion overlap for the six patients
with the greatest negative value (i.e. greatest deﬁcit beyond the
prediction from ﬂuid intelligence). The result (Fig. 5) provides a
suggestion of selective association with anterior frontal lesions,
especially in the right hemisphere.
To examine these results in the whole patient group, for each
patient we measured volume of damage in four segments of
the frontal lobe, anterior and posterior to Y=35 in left and right
hemispheres. Mean volume of damage, and variability across
patients, were similar for left anterior, right anterior and left
posterior regions, but somewhat greater for right posterior.
For each region, volumes of damage were correlated with mean
performance residuals (deﬁcits beyond the prediction from ﬂuid
intelligence, averaged across the ﬁve critical tasks) as above.
A more negative average residual (worse performance) was
associated with larger lesion volume in the right anterior region
(r=0.59, P50.005, one-tailed). No signiﬁcant correlations were
found for left anterior(r=0.24, P=0.15), right posterior (r=0.15,
P=0.25), or left posterior (r=0.19, P=0.20). The signiﬁcant cor-
relation for right anterior damage remained even after covarying
for total lesion volume, r=0.52, P50.01.
Since scores were categorical, often with a small range, for the
subtests of the Ineco Frontal Screening, data were re-examined
as appropriate using non-parametric tests (Mann–Whitney U,
Spearman rank correlation, Kruskal–Wallis H). Conclusions were
essentially identical to those based on parametric tests.
Differences between all combined frontal patients and controls
Figure 4 Experiment 2. Regressions on ﬂuid intelligence for all tasks showing signiﬁcant difference between patients and controls.
Symbols and regressions as Fig. 3.
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Working Memory; correlations with Culture Fair were signiﬁcant
for Go–No go, Digit Span, Months, and Hayling, P50.06 for
Proverbs; and no subtest showed signiﬁcant differences between
left lateral, right lateral, inferior medial and superior medial
subgroups.
Discussion
In our data, the picture of relations between executive deﬁcit and
ﬂuid intelligence is both simple and unanticipated. Certainly, the
results show that ﬂuid intelligence is a substantial contributor to
frontal deﬁcits. For one group of ‘executive’ tasks, including the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency and Iowa Gambling,
differences between patients and controls can be entirely
explained by g (cf. Fig. 1A). When ﬂuid intelligence is partialled
out, however, a second set of tasks shows remaining deﬁcits. This
second set of tasks includes Go–No go, Proverbs, Hayling, Hotel
and Faux Pas. The data give some suggestion that these addi-
tional, non-g deﬁcits may be associated with the most anterior
(especially right) frontal lesions. For these tests, results resemble
those of Fig. 1B, implying deﬁcits in some speciﬁc function largely
separate from g.
For the ﬁrst group of tasks—Wisconsin Card Sorting Test,
Verbal Fuency and Iowa Gambling—we found no speciﬁc associ-
ation with particular regions of prefrontal damage. As reviewed
earlier, previous ﬁndings for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test are
contradictory, with some studies suggesting speciﬁc deﬁcits after
dorsolateral lesions (e.g. Milner, 1963; Rezai et al., 1993), but
others not (e.g. Stuss et al., 1983, 2000). Verbal Fluency is
also a widely used test in the assessment of frontal functions.
Despite the fact that phonological ﬂuency can be impaired in a
wide range of conditions and in patients with different lesion
localizations (Crawford et al., 1993; Brooks et al., 1999; Henry
and Crawford, 2004), it has been extensively demonstrated that
frontal patients are more impaired that non-frontal patients
(Milner, 1964; Benton, 1968; Perret, 1974; Henry and Crawford,
2004). Deﬁcits have been associated with a variety of frontal
regions, including dorsolateral and superior medial (Stuss et al.,
1998; Troyer et al., 1998). They occur with either left or right
frontal lesions (e.g. Baldo and Shimamura, 1998; Davidson
et al., 2007), though are commonly stronger on the left (e.g.
Perret, 1974; Baldo and Shimamura, 1998). Further work would
be needed to show why, in our patient sample, there was no
speciﬁc association with left hemisphere lesions. One possibility
is that, by comparison with many previous studies, our lesion
sample was relatively anterior, with no lesions extending into the
temporal lobe and lesions in only two of our left lateral patients
incorporating more than 10% of Brodmann area 44. Previously, it
has been suggested that frontal deﬁcits in Verbal Fluency may be
over and above those predicted by general intelligence as mea-
sured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Henry and
Crawford, 2004). Our results suggest that ﬂuid intelligence, with
its emphasis on current problem solving, may be the more suitable
measure of g in frontal patients (Duncan et al., 1995).
Our ﬁndings on the Iowa Gambling Task and g deserve special
attention. Some prior studies show clear decision-making deﬁcits
in patients with ventromedial frontal deﬁcits, manifest in consistent
selection of risky decks (Bechara et al., 2000; Torralva et al.,
2007). Decision-making deﬁcits can exist in the absence of more
general deﬁcits, for example in working memory (Clark and
Manes, 2004). At the same time, deﬁcits in Iowa Gambling can
be seen following other kinds of prefrontal lesion (e.g. Manes
et al., 2002), and it has been suggested that this task depends
on other cognitive functions besides reward coding and use,
including learning, shifting and spatial working memory (Dunn
et al., 2006). In our data, Iowa Gambling was positively correlated
with g. Once g was removed, the deﬁcit in frontal patients
became non-signiﬁcant, but was still borderline. We found no
evidence of selective deﬁcit in patients whose lesions included
the inferior medial region. Certainly these data suggest that the
task is inﬂuenced by factors in addition to a speciﬁc risky decision-
making component, which may critically depend on ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. This risky component is perhaps more salient in
other patient groups, e.g. those with bilateral ventromedial
damage (Bechara et al., 1994) or frontal variant frontotemporal
dementia (Torralva et al., 2007).
For patients like ours, meanwhile, our data have strong implica-
tions for use and interpretation of tests such as the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency and Iowa Gambling. To a
large degree, the deﬁcits measured in such tests may not be
Figure 5 Experiment 2. Lesion overlap for 6 patients with worst average residual (performance adjusting for ﬂuid intelligence) across
Go–no go, Proverbs, Hayling, Hotel and Faux Pas tests. Left: overlap projected to brain surface; colour scale shows number of affected
patients. Right: slice illustrating maximum overlap; coordinates in MNI space.
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reﬂect a much more general cognitive loss. It remains an open
question how widely this may hold for other popular ‘executive’
tests in clinical and experimental neuropsychology.
Earlier we distinguished two plausible models of the relation
between g and executive function. According to the ﬁrst, g reﬂects
a speciﬁc cognitive function, contributing to successful perfor-
mance in many different cognitive contexts. Elsewhere, we
have proposed that g, in large part, reﬂects the control of current
behaviour by a ﬂexible internal model of relevant facts, rules and
task requirements (Duncan, 2001; Duncan et al., 2008; cf. the
‘global workspace’ of Dehaene et al., 1998, 2003). Central to
such a model is the common pattern of frontal and parietal activity
seen for a wide range of cognitive demands, including standard
tests of ﬂuid intelligence (Duncan et al., 2000; Duncan and Owen,
2000), incorporating posterior parts of the lateral frontal surface,
the anterior insula/operculum, the anterior cingulate/pre-
supplementary motor area and the intraparietal sulcus. According
to the second model, in contrast, g reﬂects average efﬁciency in a
number of separable executive functions, perhaps better measured
by individual executive tests.
On the one hand, our data show little resembling the predic-
tions from the average model illustrated in Fig. 1C and D. If a
lesion selectively affects one executive function X, the regression
line relating a test of X to g should lie below the line for control
subjects, while regression lines for other, unaffected executive
functions (Y, Z,...) should shift in the opposite direction. While
results ﬁtting this prediction would provide strong support for an
average model, however, negative results do not rule it out. For
one thing, the size of the upward shift for unaffected functions
will depend on how many separate functions are included in the
ﬂuid intelligence score. The upward shift occurs because, if one
function X is impaired, others must be correspondingly higher to
achieve a given ﬂuid intelligence level; the more functions are
included in ﬂuid intelligence, however, the smaller this upward
shift needs to be in each individual one. Perhaps even more
importantly, the predictions in Fig. 1C and D depend on the dis-
covery of performance tests that reﬂect the separate components
of ﬂuid intelligence in a reasonably pure way, and on the sensi-
tivity of these components to different regions of damage. As we
have described, the activity pattern associated with tests of ﬂuid
intelligence encompasses a number of quite different structures in
frontal and parietal cortex. Given this, it seems likely that the task
modelling function we have linked to g can, in principle, be dis-
sociated into components, and the functional imaging literature
contains a number of proposals for such dissociations (see e.g.
MacDonald et al., 2000). It is perhaps unlikely, however, that
current neuropsychological tests successfully separate the different
components of g; instead, the whole brain system comprising lat-
eral frontal surface, anterior insula/operculum, anterior cingulate/
pre-supplementary motor area, and intraparietal sulcus may work
jointly to control many different kinds of cognitive activity. If this
is so, then what appears now as a uniﬁed g may in future be
dissociated into components with purer cognitive tests and/or
better and larger patient groups.
In this article we have addressed relations between executive
impairments and ﬂuid intelligence in patients with frontal lesions.
A separate question is which lesion characteristics are most pre-
dictive of ﬂuid intelligence decrement itself. As described earlier,
functional imaging shows a speciﬁc set of frontal and parietal
activations during ﬂuid intelligence test performance.
Correspondingly, deﬁcits in ﬂuid intelligence can follow both
frontal and posterior cortical lesions (e.g. Basso et al., 1973;
Tranel et al., 2008). A plausible hypothesis is that ﬂuid intelligence
deﬁcits will be most associated with lesions in the speciﬁc fronto-
parietal network suggested by functional imaging; further data,
incorporating patients with posterior as well as frontal lesions,
would be needed to test this hypothesis.
Beyond g, our data suggest a separate set of impairments that
may be speciﬁcally associated with anterior frontal lesions. Much
recent attention has been paid to the function of this large and
more recently evolved region, which is one of the latest to achieve
myelination in the human brain. According to several accounts,
anterior prefrontal cortex is at the top of a frontal processing
hierarchy (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007).
In agreement with our results, anterior functions have been pre-
viously linked to Six Element (a precursor to Hotel) (Burgess, 2005)
and theory of mind (Frith and Frith, 2006) tasks. At least since
the 1940s, it has frequently been observed that some aspects
of frontal impairment are not well explained by conventional
‘intelligence’ (e.g. Hebb and Penﬁeld, 1940; Teuber, 1972). Our
data suggest that this may especially be so for aspects of anterior
frontal function.
Anterior deﬁcits in such a variety of tasks, from linguistic to
social, might suggest linkage simply through anatomical proximity.
Much functional imaging evidence, for example, suggests a
degree of separation between detailed patterns of anterior activity
for social versus non-social demands (Gilbert et al., 2006).
A second possibility is that some common processing theme
links these different deﬁcits, implemented though they are in dif-
ferent cognitive domains. Anterior frontal activity has previously
been linked to multi-tasking (Burgess et al., 2001; Braver and
Bongiolatti, 2002; Gilbert et al., 2006) and the ability to switch
between different cognitive contexts (Koechlin et al., 2003;
Burgess, 2005; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007), and a change of
context or perspective is certainly a feature of the tasks in which
we ﬁnd deﬁcits beyond those explained by g. In Go–No go and
Hayling, it may be signiﬁcant that deﬁcits follow a previous set of
trials with a different instruction (cf. Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre
and D’Esposito, 2007). In Hayling too, the normal process of hear-
ing a sentence must be suspended in favour of searching for a
new word generation strategy; just as, in Proverbs, the normal
process of understanding and using a proverb must be suspended
in favour of searching for a suitable abstract explanation. In Hotel,
involvement in a sub-task must be periodically suspended in
favour of the bigger picture of overall time management. Faux
Pas stories require appreciation of two different perspectives,
that of the speaker who is unaware of their blunder, and that
of the listener who is hurt by it. Though, by comparison with
multi-tasking, mentalizing capacity has been linked to more
caudal aspects of anteromedial prefrontal cortex (Gilbert et al.,
2006), at a broader level, they may share a requirement for
multiple contexts or perspectives to be maintained. While such
arguments provide little more than hints for future development,
244 | Brain 2010: 133; 234–247 M. Roca et al.it seems plausible that some common cognitive requirement does
link the disparate set of deﬁcits associated with anterior frontal
lesions.
Further work may well reveal additional frontal deﬁcits that
are separate from g. For example, functional MRI studies have
repeatedly suggested that, just anterior to the frontal eye ﬁelds
in the dorsal premotor cortex, activity is especially strong during
spatial working memory (e.g. Sala and Courtney, 2007). In ante-
rior, ventral parts of the left prefrontal cortex, there is strong
activity associated with a variety of semantic tasks (Wagner
et al., 2001). For these cases, as for anterior frontal functions in
our data, results with appropriate tasks and lesion groups might
resemble the pattern of Fig. 1B. Indeed, establishing such relations
might be greatly facilitated by our method for examining perfor-
mance residuals after correcting for g. When tasks are affected
both by speciﬁc executive processes and a common g component,
associations between speciﬁc deﬁcit and region of damage may be
clariﬁed when the g component is removed.
For a number of tasks in Experiment 2, the difference between
frontal patients and controls was not signiﬁcant. In every case but
one (Months), however, the performance of patients was numer-
ically inferior. As predicted by a deﬁcit in g, it seems likely that,
with sufﬁcient experimental power, some degree of frontal impair-
ment can ultimately be demonstrated for most or all cognitive
tests.
Our data were negative with regard to dissociations between
conventional left lateral, right lateral, inferior medial and superior
medial regions. Especially in Experiment 2, these negative results
must be interpreted in light of small patient numbers in the dif-
ferent subgroups, in particular inferior medial and superior medial.
Perhaps most surprisingly, even a comparison of patients with and
without inferior medial lesions suggested no hint of selective def-
icits, either in Iowa Gambling as discussed above, or in our two
social functioning tests. Very likely, dissociations beyond those we
saw here can be obtained with larger or different patient groups.
Other tests, too, may be more successful in pinpointing speciﬁc
functions associated with these different prefrontal regions (Stuss,
2006). Meanwhile, the broad picture from our data is of two main
groups of deﬁcits, one associated with g, and the other, manifest
in a variety of tests, perhaps associated with anterior, context-
switching functions.
From a clinical perspective, understanding executive deﬁcits
in patients with frontal lesions may greatly facilitate the design
of appropriate assessment tools and rehabilitation strategies,
with potential improvement in patients’ daily living. Our results
have clear implications for the clinical assessment of these
functions in different neurological and neuropsychiatric diseases.
In our view, an optimal frontal lobe assessment should
include tests of ﬂuid intelligence, in particular discrepancy from
premorbid score, supplemented by one or more speciﬁc
assessments of residual, putatively anterior frontal deﬁcit. In
many circumstances, these latter deﬁcits—captured in several
subtests of the Ineco Frontal Screening—may be of especial sig-
niﬁcance in impaired everyday activity. Clear separation from g
may be an essential step in improved clinical assessment and
management.
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